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We estimated the attack rate of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 and assessed risk factors for infection among close 
contacts quarantined in Beijing, People’s Republic of China. 
The ﬁ  rst 613 conﬁ  rmed cases detected between May 16 
and September 15, 2009, were investigated; 7,099 close 
contacts were located and quarantined. The attack rate 
of conﬁ  rmed infection in close contacts was 2.4% overall, 
ranging from 0.9% among aircraft passengers to >5% among 
household members. Risk factors for infection among close 
contacts were younger age, being a household member 
of an index case-patient, exposure during the index case-
patient’s symptomatic phase, and longer exposure. Among 
close contacts with positive test results at the start of 
quarantine, 17.2% had subclinical infection. Having contact 
with a household member and younger age were the major 
risk factors for acquiring pandemic (H1N1) 2009 inﬂ  uenza 
virus infection. One person in 6 with conﬁ  rmed pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 was asymptomatic.
I
n early April 2009, human cases of infection with a novel 
inﬂ  uenza virus of swine origin, pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus, were identiﬁ  ed in the United States and Mexico, and 
this virus spread rapidly across the world (1–3). On June 11, 
2009, the World Health Organization raised the pandemic 
level to 6, the highest level for pandemic alert (4).
Estimating attack rates is a major task in characterizing 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Some studies have reported attack 
rates of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 among household members 
and aircraft passengers (5–7). These studies suggested that 
the transmissibility of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus was 
low. These studies were conducted in outbreak settings, 
and attack rates were calculated on the basis of clinical 
diseases that included inﬂ  uenza-like illness (ILI) or acute 
respiratory illness (ARI) of close contacts rather than 
conﬁ   rmed infection with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. 
In addition, in these studies only symptomatic index and 
secondary cases were included. Although most infections 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 inﬂ  uenza virus produce ILI or 
ARI symptoms (8–12), subclinical infection can occur 
and can change the estimate of attack rate. In addition, 
the infectivity of asymptomatic case-patients has not been 
clearly deﬁ  ned (13).
Because of the high rates of illness and death among 
the initial case-patients with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (14), 
the Chinese government decided to prevent and contain the 
rapid spread of disease through tracing and quarantine of 
persons who had close contact with persons with conﬁ  rmed 
cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009. Beijing, the capital of 
the People’s Republic of China, took strict containment 
and control measures through October 2009. The Beijing 
municipal government implemented border entry screening, 
ILI screening in hospitals, health follow-up of travelers from 
overseas, and quarantine and testing of close contacts to 
identify new introduction of cases and local transmission. 
Public health workers conducted epidemiologic investigation 
of all index case-patients (including those with subclinical 
infections) and traced and quarantined close contacts 
whose residence was within the jurisdiction of Beijing. We 
estimated the attack rate of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus 
infection and assessed risk factors or correlates for infection 
among different types of close contacts, including household 
members and aircraft passengers.
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Methods
Conﬁ  rmation of Index Cases
In 2009, under the guidance of the Beijing Center for 
Disease Prevention and Control (Beijing CDC), a network 
of 55 collaborating laboratories was established to perform 
reverse transcription PCR testing to conﬁ   rm cases of 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (15). The conﬁ  rmed cases included 
symptomatic and asymptomatic cases, and these cases were 
detected mainly by border entry screening, ILI screening in 
hospitals, health follow-up of travelers from overseas, and 
quarantine and testing of close contacts. Once conﬁ  rmed, 
index case-patients were immediately quarantined in 
designated hospitals to receive treatment while in isolation. 
All the conﬁ   rmed cases were required by law to be 
reported to Beijing and local CDCs. From May through 
October 2009, a detailed epidemiologic investigation was 
conducted for each conﬁ  rmed case of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 (including symptomatic and asymptomatic cases) by 
Beijing and local CDCs within 6 hours after conﬁ  rmation of 
infection. Patients with conﬁ  rmed cases were interviewed 
about demographic characteristics, course of illness, travel 
and contact history, and information about close contacts. 
Patients with conﬁ  rmed cases were categorized as having 
imported cases (travelers) and locally acquired cases (no 
travel history) on the basis of where the infection was 
acquired.
Deﬁ  nition of Close Contacts
Close contacts were deﬁ  ned as anyone who ever came 
within 2 meters of an index case-patient without the use of 
effective personal protective equipment (PPE) (including 
masks and gloves, with or without gowns or goggles) 
during the presumed infectious period. Trained staff from 
local CDCs made the determinations on the basis of ﬁ  eld 
investigation. The relationships of close contacts to index 
case-patients were categorized as 1) spouses, 2) other 
household members, 3) nonrelated roommates, 4) contacts 
at workplace or school, 5) nonhousehold relatives, 6) 
passengers on the same ﬂ  ight, 7) friends, and 8) service 
persons met at public places. A close contact on an aircraft 
was deﬁ  ned as a passenger sitting within 3 rows in front 
and 3 rows behind the index case-patient.
All close contacts were traced and quarantined for 
7 days after the most recent exposure to the index case-
patient. All index case-patients detected between May 16 
(the ﬁ  rst case, the date of conﬁ  rmation) and September 15, 
2009 (before widespread transmission in Beijing), and their 
close contacts were included in this study. We excluded 
cluster or outbreak cases for which close contacts could not 
be determined clearly by epidemiologic investigation (the 
transmission chain was obscure).
Laboratory Screening
For each close contact, before quarantine, a pharyngeal 
swab specimen was collected for reverse transcription PCR 
testing, regardless of symptoms. A second pharyngeal 
swab specimen was collected for testing for pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus if any of the following symptoms 
developed in a close contact during quarantine: axillary 
temperature >37.3°C, cough, sore throat, nasal congestion, 
or rhinorrhea.
Statistical Analysis
Data were analyzed by using SPSS version 11.5 (SPSS 
Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). Median and range values were 
calculated for continuous variables, and percentages were 
calculated for categorical variables. Differences in attack 
rates were compared between subgroups of close contacts 
by using the χ2 test. For the signiﬁ  cant difference found in 
multiple subgroups, this test does not enable identiﬁ  cation 
of which multiple subgroups are signiﬁ  cantly  different, 
only that across all the subgroups there are differences. 
The variables with p<0.10 in χ2 test were included in 
multivariate analysis. Multivariate unconditional logistic 
regression analysis was conducted to determine risk factors 
associated with infection in close contacts. Backward 
logistic regression was conducted by removing variables 
with p>0.10. Odds ratios (ORs) and 95% conﬁ  dence 
intervals were calculated for potential risk factors of 
infection. The Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-ﬁ  t  test 
was used to assess the model ﬁ  t for logistic regression. All 
statistical tests were 2-sided, and signiﬁ  cance was deﬁ  ned 
as p<0.05.
Results
Timeliness and Intensity of Index 
Case Detection and Contact Tracing
A total of 613 eligible index case-patients, detected 
from May 16 through September 15, 2009, were included 
in this study. Through ﬁ  eld epidemiologic investigations, 
7,099 close contacts were traced and quarantined in 
Beijing. The median number of close contacts per index 
case per day was 7.0 persons (range 2.0–95.0 persons); the 
median number for an imported index case was 7.0 persons 
(range 1.7–95.0 persons) and for a locally acquired index 
case was 5.3 persons (range 1.0–25.0 persons). For the 
601 symptomatic index case-patients, the median interval 
between illness onset and sample collection was 1.0 days 
(range −1.9 to 7.0 days).
Among close contacts with symptomatic infection, the 
median interval between illness onset and sample collection 
was 0.5 days. More than 85% of close contacts were 
quarantined within 72 hours after interview of the index 
case-patients. The median interval between ﬁ  rst exposure 
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and quarantine was 3.4 days for the close contacts, and 
it was shorter, on average, for ﬂ  ight passenger contacts 
than nonpassenger contacts (1.7 days vs. 3.8 days). For 
symptomatic close contacts infected with pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009, the median of generation time (i.e., the 
time from illness onset in an index case to illness onset in 
a secondary case) were 2.4 days; it was shorter for ﬂ  ight 
passenger contacts than nonpassenger contacts (1.6 days 
vs. 2.5 days) (Table 1).
Characteristics of Index Case-Patients 
and Close Contacts
Approximately 43% of the index case-patients were 
women; the median age was 20 years, and 38% likely 
contracted pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus locally because 
they had not traveled recently. Among the index case-
patientss, 2% had subclinical infection. Only 18% of index 
case-patients had close contacts with conﬁ  rmed pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 (Table 2), and the total number of close 
contacts who were infected by the virus from 110 index 
case-patients was 167.
Fifty percent (3,514 of 7,032) of close contacts were 
women, and the median age was 27 years. Approximately 
12% of close contacts were household member of index 
case-patients (spouse or other household member), and 
aircraft passengers accounted for 44% of close contacts. 
Approximately 61% of close contacts were exposed to 
symptomatic index case-patients during their symptomatic 
phase. About 70% were quarantined in a quarantine station 
(Table 2).
Attack Rate
The overall attack rate for infection among close 
contacts (positive test result) was 2.4% (167 of 7,099), 
indicating that 1 index case-patient transmitted infection to 
0.27 close contacts (167 of 613) on average (reproduction 
number = 0.27). Among those close contacts with a positive 
test result, 14.4% (24 of 167) had subclinical infection; 
among the close contacts with positive test results at the 
start of quarantine, 17.2% (20 of 116) had subclinical 
infection.
Attack rates did not differ by index case-patient’s sex 
(p = 0.225). However, attack rates differed signiﬁ  cantly 
by index case-patient’s age (p = 0.022), and the lower 
attack rate was found for older index case-patients. There 
was no signiﬁ   cant difference in attack rates between 
close contacts of patients with imported cases and those 
with locally acquired cases (p = 0.282). No infection was 
found in close contacts exposed to index case-patients 
with subclinical infection, and the attack rate observed in 
close contacts exposed to symptomatic index case-patients 
during their symptomatic phase was higher (p<0.001). 
Almost identical attack rates were found among male and 
female close contacts (p = 0.808). However, attack rates 
were signiﬁ  cantly different among different age groups of 
close contacts (p<0.001), and the lowest attack rate was 
found for those >50 years of age. The attack rates were 
signiﬁ   cantly different across 8 contact types (p<0.001). 
The attack rate was 5.3% among spouses and 6.6% among 
other family members in the household, and was lower 
among other types of close contacts (Table 3).The attack 
rate among passengers on the same ﬂ  ight was low, 0.9% 
overall, and 1 index case-patient transmitted infection 
to 0.19 close contacts on a ﬂ  ight on average (28 of 147), 
and the attack rate was higher among the passengers with 
longer ﬂ  ight times (>12 hours, p = 0.001). The attack rate 
among close contacts of service persons at public places 
was 0.2%, and 1 index case-patient transmitted infection 
to 0.01 close contacts of service persons on average (1 of 
113). Nonpassenger close contacts with longer exposure 
duration (>12 hours), compared with those with shorter 
duration (>12 hours), recorded the higher attack rate 
(p<0.001) (Table 3).
Risk Factors
By multivariate analysis, age and type of contact were 
the major predictors of infection (Table 4). Compared 
with close contacts >50 years of age, those 20–50 years 
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Table 1. Timeliness and intensity of contact tracing for pandemic (H1N1) 2009, Beijing, People’s Republic of China* 
Contact type 
Median no. days (range) 
Hours from interview of index case-patient to 
quarantine of close contacts, % (no./total no.)† 
First 
exposure to 
quarantine† 
Last
exposure to 
quarantine† 
Illness onset  
to sample 
collection‡ 
Generation 
time‡§ <24 >24–48 >48–72  >72
All close 
contacts
41.3
(69/167) 
26.3
(44/167) 
21.6
(36/167) 
10.8
(18/167) 
3.4 (0.2–8.1) 1.9 (0.1–6.8) 0.5 (4.5 to 5.0)  2.4 (0.2–6.8)
Flight passenger 
contacts
60.7
(17/28) 
28.6
(8/28) 
10.7
(3/28) 
0
(0/28) 
1.7 (0.2–5.6) 1.2 (0.2–3.8) 0.4 (1.0 to 1.9)  1.6 (0.3–4.8)
Nonpassenger
contacts
37.4
(52/139) 
25.9
(36/139) 
23.7
(33/139) 
12.9
(18/139) 
3.8 (0.2–8.1) 1.9 (0.1–6.8) 0.6 (4.5 to 5.0)  2.5 (0.2–6.8)
*Data available for those who were infected because more detailed information was collected in field records. 
†Data for close contacts infected with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza. 
‡Data for symptomatic close contacts infected with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus. Negative values indicate that the time of sample collection was 
before that of illness onset. 
§Generation time is time from illness onset in an index case-patient to illness onset in a secondary case-patient.   Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, China
(OR 3.42; p = 0.002) and 0–19 years of age (OR 7.76; 
p< 0.001) were at higher risk for infection. Other signiﬁ  cant 
independent risk factors associated with infection included 
being a household member of a person with an index case 
(OR 3.83; p<0.001), being exposed to index case-patients 
during their symptomatic phase (OR 1.86; p = 0.003), and 
exposure duration >12 hours (OR 1.83; p = 0.002). Similar 
risk factors were observed among aircraft passengers.
Discussion
We estimated that pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus was 
transmitted by 18% of index case-patients to their close 
contacts and that 2.4% (167 of 7,099) of close contacts 
we traced were infected. Our data indicate that pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 virus has low transmissibility in nonoutbreak 
settings.
We found that 1 index case-patient transmitted 
infection to 0.27 close contacts on average, i.e., 
reproduction number = 0.27. This ﬁ  nding suggests that 
among those quarantined index case-patients, the number 
of persons with secondary cases who could be traced 
through rigorous ﬁ  eld investigation was small and far less 
than the number needed for the sustainable transmission of 
infectious disease in the population (reproduction number 
>1). However, the fact that the pandemic eventually spread 
in Beijing indicates that contact and case tracing were far 
from complete, especially later in the summer and early fall 
of 2009. The strict control measures may have worked to 
some extent at the beginning but were outpaced by local 
transmission (16); the percentage of locally acquired 
infections ranged from <10% in June 2009 to >80% in 
September 2009 (data not shown).
In this study, the median number of close contacts 
per index case-patient per day was 7.0 persons. Although 
locating and quarantining these close contacts was done 
quickly, and stringent quarantine measures were used, 
which hindered implementation of control measures, the 
real number of close contacts was unknown and probably 
exceeded this number. Many close contacts were persons 
met in public places, including public transportation, 
theaters or cinemas, and shopping malls, and it is nearly 
impossible to trace all of the contacts. In addition, some 
persons who had worn PPE during contact with index case-
patients were excluded from close contacts management 
(i.e., they were not quarantined), but because wearing PPE 
might not protect (or fully protect) against infection, some 
persons excluded might have become infected. In addition, 
many persons with mild and asymptomatic cases cannot be 
detected, but they may transmit the virus. Furthermore, the 
short generation time of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 shown in 
this study and in a previous study (13) could lead to the rapid 
accumulation of infection sources and close contacts. This 
rapid compounding could overwhelm response capacity 
and would have resulted in compromised effectiveness of 
containment measures. It should also be mentioned that we 
did not include persons with cluster or outbreak cases for 
whom close contacts could not be determined clearly by 
epidemiologic investigation to examine the basic feature 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 (e.g., generation time), and 
the reproduction number obtained from our data is an 
underestimate.
Attack rates of infection differed signiﬁ  cantly  by 
contact type. Among household members of index case-
patients, the attack rate was the highest, as shown in the 
multivariate analysis after controlling for age and other 
factors. The most likely reason for this ﬁ   nding is that 
household members are more likely to have come into 
closer contact with index case-patients for a longer period 
with shorter distance and longer duration. Another possible 
reason is that household members may have some certain 
linkage with index cases in genetic susceptibility or living 
habits that would cause higher predisposition in household 
members than in other close contacts. This ﬁ  nding is similar 
to ﬁ  ndings in other investigations of respiratory infectious 
disease (17).
Close contacts on ﬂ  ights accounted for the highest 
proportion of all the close contacts, in part because of how 
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Table 2. Characteristics of 613 index case-patients with 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 and their close contacts, Beijing, China* 
Characteristic No. (%) 
Index case-patients 
 Female  sex  265 (43.2) 
 Locally  acquired  cases  230 (37.5) 
 Subclinical  infection  12 (2.0) 
  Infected close contacts  110 (17.9) 
Close contacts, n = 7,099 
 Female  sex†  3,514 (50.0) 
  Relationship to index case-patient 
  Spouse  75 (1.1) 
  Other  household  member  786 (11.1) 
  Nonrelated  roommate  367 (5.2) 
    Contact at workplace or school  1,610 (22.7) 
  Nonhousehold  relative  177 (2.5) 
    Passenger on the same flight  3,129 (44.1) 
  Friend  523 (7.4) 
    Service person met at public place  432 (6.1) 
 Contact  phase 
    Exposure to symptomatic index  
  case-patient  during  symptomatic  phase 
4,305 (60.6) 
    Exposure to symptomatic index  
    case-patient the day before illness onset 
2,642 (37.2) 
    Exposure to person with subclinical  
  index  case 
149 (2.1) 
 Type  of  quarantine 
  Quarantine  station  4,988 (70.3) 
  H o m e   2,111 (29.7) 
*For index case-patients, median age (range) was 20 (1–75) y. For close 
contacts, median age (range) was 27 (0–99) y (data for 5,979 close 
contacts available). 
†Data for 7,032 close contacts available. RESEARCH
the index cases were detected and the broad deﬁ  nition 
we used for close contacts. However, the attack rate was 
much lower than that for other close contacts; 1 index case 
infected only 0.19 close contacts on ﬂ  ights on average. 
This ﬁ  nding indicated that the possibility of transmission 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus on ﬂ  ights was low, and the 
yield of tracing and quarantining of close contacts on ﬂ  ights 
was limited. Tracing contacts of service persons at public 
places was more difﬁ  cult than tracing other categories of 
contacts, and the lowest attack rate (0.2%) was recorded in 
this category. Despite extensive measures, on average, only 
0.01 infected close contacts per index case-patient were 
identiﬁ   ed among service persons. Tracing the contacts 
of service persons at public places seems far less cost-
effective. Criteria for close contacts on ﬂ  ights and those of 
service persons should be reﬁ  ned with respect to exposure 
duration and age of those exposed.
Exposure to index case-patients for >12 hours was a 
signiﬁ  cant independent risk factor for infection in ﬂ  ight 
passenger contacts. This ﬁ  nding suggests that limiting the 
time of contact with persons with ILI on aircraft can reduce 
risk for transmission, and a long duration of exposure may 
be necessary for transmission to occur on aircraft.
Younger close contacts were at higher risk for infection 
than older ones. The possible reason was that younger 
persons had much closer contact with index case-patients 
than did older persons; another reason may be that younger 
persons were more susceptible to infection with pandemic 
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Table 3. Attack rate for pandemic (H1N1) 2009, including subclinical infection, by characteristics of index case-patients and close
contacts, Beijing, People’s Republic of China 
Characteristic Attack rate, % (no. infected/total contacts)  F
2 p value
Overall 2.4 (167/7,099)  NA*
Index case-patient 
 Sex   
  M   2.2 (91/4,192)  0.225 
  F   2.6 (76/2,907) 
 Age,  y 
  0–19  2.7 (113/4,144)  0.022 
  20–50  1.9 (52/2,680) 
  >50  0.7 (2/275) 
 Infection  source 
  Imported  case  2.5 (125/5,049)  0.282 
  Community-acquired  case  2.0 (42/2,050) 
  By type of exposure 
    Exposure to symptomatic index case-patient in symptomatic phase  3.1 (135/4,305)  <0.001 
    Exposure to symptomatic index case-patient before illness onset  1.2 (32/2,642) 
    Exposure to subclinical index case-patient  0 (0/149) 
Close contacts 
 Sex 
  M   2.3 (82/3,518)  0.808 
  F   2.4 (85/3,514) 
 Age,  y 
  0–19  4.5 (82/1,837)  <0.001 
  20–50  2.4 (78/3,299) 
  >50  0.8 (7/843) 
  Relationship to index case-patient 
  Spouse  5.3 (4/75)  <0.001 
  Other  household  member  6.6 (52/786) 
  Nonrelated  roommate  2.5 (9/367) 
    Contact at workplace or school  3.0 (49/1,610) 
  Nonhousehold  relative  2.8 (5/177) 
    Passenger on the same flight  0.9 (28/3,129) 
  Friend  3.6 (19/523) 
    Service person met at public place  0.2 (1/432) 
  Flight time for passenger on the same flight, h 
<12 0.4 (8/1,846)  0.001 
  >12  1.6 (20/1,283) 
  Exposure duration of nonpassenger close contact, h 
<12 1.9 (38/2,054)  <0.001 
  >12  5.3 (101/1,912) 
*Not available.  Pandemic (H1N1) 2009, China
(H1N1) 2009 virus (18). This ﬁ  nding was consistent with 
ﬁ  ndings reported in other studies (5,6).
No secondary cases were found among close contacts 
exposed to index case-patients with subclinical infection. 
The attack rate among close contacts who were exposed to 
symptomatic index case-patients during their symptomatic 
phase was much higher than that among those exposed 
to these case-patients before their illness onset. Exposure 
to index case-patients during the symptomatic phase was 
a signiﬁ  cant independent risk factor for infection among 
close contacts. These ﬁ  ndings indicate that the infectivity 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus was higher after illness 
onset, and that the infectivity of symptomatic pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 case-patients before illness onset was higher 
than that of persons with subclinical cases, although 
persons in each group were asymptomatic when in contact 
with other persons.
In general, the earliest infectious time for pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 was considered as 1 day before illness onset 
(19). We found that index case-patients and infected close 
contacts shed pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus <1 day before 
illness onset, which suggests that the infectious period of 
symptomatic persons with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 might 
be <1 day before illness onset.
Among close contacts with pandemic (H1N1) 
2009, ≈14.4% were asymptomatic. It is noteworthy that 
specimens from some close contacts tested negative for 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus before quarantine, but those 
persons could shed the virus during quarantine without 
symptoms. Such infection could not be detected, and the 
proportion of subclinical infection was underestimated. 
Therefore, we calculated the proportion of subclinical 
infection by cross-sectional analysis of the subclinical 
infection of close contacts before quarantine, and we found 
that ≈17% of case-patients with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
were asymptomatic.
This study has several limitations. We could not ﬁ  nd 
all close contacts of persons with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
and did not know their infection status, so the infection 
parameters of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 that we found in 
this study might not be precise, especially for reproduction 
number, which may be underestimated to some extent. 
Furthermore, we could not exclude the possibility that the 
infected close contacts had been infected from another 
unknown source before quarantine started, which might 
inﬂ  uence our conclusion to some extent.
In summary, the attack rate among close contacts was 
low, even among household contacts. Household member 
and younger age were the major risk factors for infection 
with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus among close contacts. 
Approximately 17% of cases of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
were asymptomatic.
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Table 4. Factors significantly associated with infection of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus in close contacts in multivariate analysis*
Factor 
All close contacts†  Flight passenger contacts‡  Nonflight passenger contacts§ 
OR (95% CI)  p value  OR (95% CI)  p value  OR (95% CI)  p value 
Age of close contacts, y 
 >50  Reference  Reference  Reference 
 20–50  3.42 (1.56–7.48)  0.002  3.13 (0.40–24.76)  0.280  2.89 (1.23–6.80)  0.015 
 0–19  7.76 (3.52–17.09)  <0.001  13.33 (1.77–100.22)  0.012  4.97 (2.06–12.00)  <0.001 
Relationship to index case-patient 
 Nonhousehold  member    Reference  NA Reference 
 Household  member    3.83 (2.65–5.53)  <0.001  NA NA 2.37 (1.58–3.55)  <0.001 
Type of exposure to index case-patient 
  During asymptomatic phase¶  Reference  Reference  Reference 
  During symptomatic phase  1.86 (1.23–2.80)  0.003  NA NA 1.79 (1.09–2.93)  0.021 
Exposure duration of close contacts, h 
 <12 Reference  Reference  Reference 
 >12  1.83 (1.25–2.67)  0.002  3.41 (1.49–7.78)  0.004  NA NA
*Variables with p<0.1 in Table 2 were included in multivariate unconditional logistic regression analysis. Hosmer-Lemeshow goodness-of-fit test was used 
to assess the model fit for logistic regression. OR, odd ratio; CI, confidence interval; NA, not available, indicating not included in the final model. 
†One dependent variable (infection with pandemic [H1N1] 2009 virus) and 5 independent variables (age of index case-patient, type of exposure to index 
case-patients, age of close contacts, relationships to index case-patients, and exposure duration of close contacts) were included in multivariate analysis. 
One independent variable (age of index case-patient) was removed in the stepwise regression equation. The goodness-of-fit test suggested that the 
logistic regression model fitted well (p = 0.631). 
‡One dependent variable (infection with pandemic [H1N1] 2009 virus) and 4 independent variables (age of index case-patient, type of exposure to index 
case-patient, age of close contacts, and exposure duration of close contacts) were included in multivariate analysis. Two independent variables (age of 
index case-patient and type of exposure to index case-patient) were removed in the stepwise regression equation. The goodness-of-fit test suggested that 
the logistic regression model fitted well (p = 0.982). 
§One dependent variable (infection with pandemic [H1N1] 2009 virus) and 5 independent variables (age of index case-patient, type of exposure to index 
case-patient, age of close contacts, relationships to index case-patient, and exposure duration of close contacts) were included in multivariate analysis. 
Two independent variables (age of index case-patient and exposure duration of close contacts) were removed in the stepwise regression equation. The 
goodness-of-fit test suggested the logistic regression model fitted well (p = 0.751). 
¶Exposed to symptomatic index case-patients before their illness onset or exposed to index case-patients who had subclinical infections. RESEARCH
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